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WILL THE TELEPHONE COMPANIES
JOIN THE SCRAMBLE
FOR MULTI-COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES?
An Analysis of Chesapeake and Potomac
Telephone Company v. United States
The original Star Trek series introduced children growing up in the
1960's to some never-before-seen, fantastic technological wonders. For
years, that generation has been waiting for those wonders to become
accessible to the average person. Although technology has not yet
advanced to the point where the phrase "Beam me up, Scottie"' will result
in instantaneous transportation to a specified destination, today's society
may have reached the era of a multi-communications system comparable
to that used by Lieutenant Uhura2 on board the Starship Enterprise
(although, of course, not an intergalactic communications system).
Through such a system, users can access "[e]lectronic games, first-
run movies, newspapers, home shopping, reference libraries, medical
diagnostic services, [and] video mail."4 They can also "buy books, pay
bills, play poker against people in other parts of town and book airline
reservations. A small camera atop the TV even enables them to make
video phone calls to a similarly equipped family."5
This multi-communications package-a combination telephone,
television, and computer system-has been referred to as teleputers,6
1. Scottie was the engineer on the Starship Enterprise. Michael Harrington, To Boldly Go into
Print-SECOND SIGHT STAR TREK, SUNDAY TEERAPH, Nov. 7, 1993, at 35.
2. Uhura was the communications officer on the Starship Enterprise. John C. Kuehner, Star
Trek to Mentor Art Gallery; Actress Who Played Uhura Promotes Prints, PLAIN DEALER (Clev.),
Dec. 11, 1993, at lB.
3. The television series, Star Trek, featured the Starship Enterprise and was aired from 1966
to 1969. Id In addition, there were also six movies based on the same concept. Id NBC
originally ran the 79 episodes of the series. Isabel Forgang, Captain's Log Hits Bookshelves;
William Shatner Records 'Star Trek' History, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 3, 1993, at El. The
reruns of the series are currently showing on BBC. Harrington, supra note 1.
4. Joshua Quittner, Online to A Revolution; The Amazing-and Some Say Ominous-New
World of TV, Telephone and Computer Is Heading Your Way, NEwSDAY, July 18, 1993, at 4.
Quitmer speculates that such a method of communication, which he refers to as teleputers, may
occur before the end of this century or may be delayed until the next century. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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personal communication services ("PCS"),7 or interactive and video data
services ("IVDS").' As recently as July of 1993, the reality of such a
system finally appeared to be in the immediate future.9 Even President
Clinton, referring to this multi-communications system when discussing the
"Information Highways," the system that would transport such data, seemed
to believe that it would be developed very soon.'0
During the summer of 1993, computer companies were already
developing the necessary hardware to send and receive such data." The
question, though, was how to transmit the information to the average
consumer.' Traditionally, information was disseminated via airwaves and
via cables. However, no provisions had been made for the airwave
transmission of this multi-communications type of data, and Section 533(b)
of the Cable Communications Act of 1984 (the "Act")13 prohibited local
telephone companies from directly transmitting "video programming"
(through cross-ownership) in their service areas. Therefore, there seemed
to be a stalemate on the development of this multi-communications
package.
In mid-1993, though, the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") announced that certain airwaves would be available through
wireless systems (such as cellular telephones) for PCS'4 and IVDS. 15 At
approximately the same time, in Chesapeake and Potomac TeL Co. v.
United States16 ("Chesapeake and Potomac"), a Virginia district court
7. Carla Lazzareschi, The Next Mother Lode?; Giants Fight over New Generation of Wireless
Phones; Critics Scoff, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1993, at D1.
8. John Eckhouse, FCCAwarding Interactive TVRights by Lot, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 15, 1993,
at Dl.
9. Quittner, supra note 4.
10. See Information Highway May Get Crowded, Hill Finds, 3 PREDICASTS No. 14 (1993).
Even though these systems seem inevitable, some skeptics were more cautious than the President
about how quickly it would be instigated due to a lack of public policy, affordability, and
accessibility for most households. Quitner, supra note 4.
11. Quittner, supra note 4.
12. Quitmer, supra note 4..
13. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1988). It also prohibits the telephone companies' affiliates from
using their "channels of communications" for the transmission of "video programming." Id.
§ 533(b)(2). The FCC may allow a waiver to this prohibition if such video programming is for
an FCC-defined rural area or if the video programming would not be otherwise accessible to the
telephone company's subscribers. Id. § 533(b)(3)-(4).
14. Lazzarechi, supra note 7.
15. Eckhouse, supra note 8.
16. 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993).
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judge held that Section 533(b),17 prohibiting cross-ownership, was
unconstitutional. 18
The Chesapeake and Potomac case is vital to the average consumer
since most households in the U.S. have telephone systems and/or cable
television hookups. 9 This multi-communications system could be directly
transmitted into the home through the cables of one of these existing lines.
The district court's holding, however, is vulnerable to reversal
through appellate review. In fact, due to its significance for both the
telephone and cable television industries, the Chesapeake and Potomac
Telephone Company ("C & P"), expects this case to be appealed, probably
all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court."
This Note will first discuss the background of Section 533(b) and of
Chesapeake and Potomac.2 Next, this Note will address the legal issues
of standing,' C & P's First Amendment rights, and the resulting level
of scrutiny.24 Last, this Note will analyze several weaknesses of the
district court's holding.'
I. BACKGROUND
A. Section 533(b) of the Cable Communications Act of 1984
Section 533(b) of the Act formalized the 1970 FCC regulation
prohibiting cross-ownership of telephone and community antenna television
services ("CATV," the term for cable television in those early days).'
17. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b).
18. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 932.
19. In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules (Second Report and
Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), 7
FCC Rec. 5781, 5848 (1992) [hereinafter Video Dialtone Order].
20. Telephone interview with Wiley R. Wright, Attorney, Hazel & Thomas, P.C. (Sept. 9,
1993). The significance of the case to both industries is shown by the fact that the National Cable
Television Association, Inc. was a party to the case as an intervenor-defendant and that 33 amici
curiae, many of whom were associated with one of the two industries, subinitted briefs to the
court. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 911-12.
21. See infra part L
22. See infra part JI.A.
23. See infra part ILB.
24. See infra part I.B.2.
25. See infra part 11L
26. The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. § 214, allowed the FCC to require
licensure for all new telephone companies. The FCC decided after conducting studies that it
would prohibit cross-ownership through the granting of such certificates. Applications of
Telephone Common Carriers for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities Furnished to
1994]
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The FCC's major concern was to encourage competition in the then infant
CATV marketV and to protect emerging CATV companies from the unfair
advantages the telephone companies would have as legally protected
monopolies.O
When Congress passed the Act, the House Committee Report stated
that the intent of the Act was "to codify current FCC rules concerning the
provision of video programming over cable systems by common carri-
ers."29  Therefore, with the exception of substituting the term "video
programming" for CATV, the FCC regulations became codified law.
From 1986 to 1988, the FCC conducted a study that examined
whether the cross-ownership restriction was still necessary.30 It decided
that the restriction had served its purpose of preventing the telephone
companies from establishing monopolies in cable television program-
ming." A continued restriction, however, would inhibit the growth of
other services, such as those offered through a PCS system, that could be
provided by either the telephone or cable television companies. 32 Since
the FCC held that "nonstructural alternatives to the prohibition... appear
likely to control telephone companies' potential anticompetitive con-
duct,"3 3 it implied that Section 533(b) should be eliminated. Instead, non-
legislative, administrative regulations promulgated by the FCC could
control the unfair advantage the telephone companies might have through
their status as legally protected monopolies.
At this time, the FCC did not recommend to Congress that Section
533(b) be repealed. As the only "nonstructural alternatives" actually
specified by the FCC were "accounting safeguards,"' its main concern
appeared to be that the telephone companies would gain a competitive edge
in the PCS marketplace by subsidizing their video programming with
income from their monopolistic activities. For example, the telephone
companies could use their telephone technicians, paid through their
Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, 21 F.C.C.2d 307,325 (1970), recons. in part,
22 F.C.C.2d 746 (1970), aff'd sub nor. General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. United States, 449
F.2d 846, 853 (5th Cir. 1971) [hereinafter The 1970 Order].
27. The 1970 Order, 21 F.C.C.2d at 325.
28. Video Dialtone Order, 7 F.C.C. Rec. 5781, 5848.
29. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1984).
30. In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules (Further Notice of
Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule Making), 3 F.C.C. Rec. 5849 (1988).
31. Id.
32. Id at 5857.
33. Id. at 5866.
34. Id.
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monopolistic telephone services, to provide services for their cable
television services. As a result, the telephone companies' overhead for their
cable television services would be lower. They could then pass those
savings on to their customers through reduced prices, thus undercutting
their competition.
In 1992, after further study, the FCC specifically recommended "to
Congress that it amend the Cable [Communications] Act [of 1984] to
permit the local telephone companies to provide video programming
directly to subscribers in their telephone service areas."'  However, as the
FCC was still concerned that the telephone companies would take
advantage of their status as monopolies to subsidize their video program-
ming services, it strongly recommended that the FCC be given discretionary
power to utilize any "nonstructural safeguards" necessary to prohibit such
"anticompetitive abuses."
36
Since the publication of the 1988 study, Congress has considered the
recommended changes in eight hearings and in six bills without taking any
conclusive action." Therefore, when C & P filed its case against the
federal government, it was still subject to the provisions of Section 533(b).
B. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. v. United States
C & P, a subsidiary of Bell Atlantic Corporation, is the local
telephone company for Alexandria, Virginia.38 C & P obtained written
verification from both Alexandria's mayor and city attorney that, absent
Section 533(b)(1)-(2) which prohibits video programming by local
telephone companies and their affiliates in the service areas of those
telephone companies, C & P would be eligible to apply for a cable
television franchise from the city.39 It then filed this lawsuit challenging
Section 553(b)(1)-(2) as violative of its First Amendment rights.'
C & P claimed that, prior to 1991, the effect of Section 533(b) on its
right to provide video programming was minimal since the consent decree
from AT&T's divestiture had already prevented the Baby Bells from
35. Video Dialtone Order, 7 F.C.C. Rec. 5781, 5847 (1992).
36. Id at 5850-51.
37. See Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 914-15 nn.9-10.
38. Id. at 911.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 910-11.
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providing such services.41 After the consent decree's prohibition was
lifted in 1991, Section 533(b) became the only bar to C & P's entering the
cable television market in Alexandria.42
Alexandria had only one cable television supplier which provided
cable services/access to over ninety percent of Alexandria's households.43
Both parties also stipulated that this supplier was the "eighth largest
multiple-system operator in the country, and the world's largest cable TV
management company."'  Besides having a virtual monopoly on the cable
television services in Alexandria, the supplier had also recently been
granted FCC licenses to test radio-based telephone services in Alexan-
dria.45 As a result, Section 533(b) effectively protected the supplier from
competition with C & P in cable television services but did not prohibit the
supplier from entering into competition with C & P in telephone services.
II. LEGAL ISSUES IN CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC
A. Standing
The government defendants (the "Government") first challenged
C & P's standing to bring a suit in federal court.' Claiming that C & P's
suit failed both the causation and the redressability aspects of standing, the
Government requested that C & P's claims be dismissed without further
discussion of the merits.' 7
The Government described the causation and redressability require-
ments for standing as follows:
MIhere must be a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of-the injury has to be "fairly
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not
41. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 17;
Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memoran-
dum]. In the 1980's, to settle an antitrust lawsuit filed by the Justice Department, AT&T agreed
to the breakup of its local telephone services. Show: Morning Edition, National Public Radio,
Jan. 8, 1992, available in NEXIS Library, Omni File. The resulting local telephone companies
are commonly referred to as the Baby Bells. Id
42. Plaintiffs' Memorandaum at 18.
43. Id
44. Id
45. Id. at 19.
46. The Government Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion, and in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion, for Summary Judgment at 26-36, Chesapeake and Potomac, 830
F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993) [hereinafter Defendants' Memorandum].
47. Id at 28.
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... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party
not before the court." [Also], it must be "likely," as opposed
to merely "speculative," that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. 4
The Government claimed C & P's alleged injury was "the inability
to provide cable television service to subscribers in Alexandria."49  In
order to provide such services, C & P had to obtain the requisite franchise
from Alexandria. Therefore, the Government argued that the injury was
"traceable" to the "lack of a franchise" and not to Section 533(b)50 and
that the ability to obtain such a franchise was dependent on the approval of
the Virginia State Corporation Commission.' As C & P was considered
a "public service company," the Government claimed that Virginia's laws
would not have allowed C & P to provide cable television services even in
the absence of Section 533(b). 2 The Government cited General Tel. Co.
of the Southwest v. United Statesf3 as federal authority which held that "'it
cannot be said that the furnishing of [cable television] services is incidental
to the function of providing local telephone service."'' " Since C & P
could not gain the approval of the Virginia State Corporation Commission
to provide cable television services, the Government claimed that C & P's
injury was not due to Section 533(b) but rather to the inability of the state
commission to grant the franchise.55
To show that the injury would not be redressed even if Section
533(b) were found unconstitutional, the Government compared this case to
Warth v. Seldin.56 In Warth, low-income plaintiffs challenged local
48. Id. at 26-27 (quoting Eckstein v. Cullen, 803 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 (E.D. Va. 1992))
(citation omitted).
49. Defendants' Memorandum at 28.
50. Id. at 28, 32.
51. Id. at 28-29.
52. Id at 28-31 & n.24. Public service companies were, under state law, only allowed to
provide their public services and any services "incidental to" those public services. The
government discusses the relationship between Virginia Code § 56-77, § 56-232, and § 56-76 to
conclude that C & P was a "public service company." Id at n.24.
53. 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971). As federal authority, General TeL is non-binding on
Virginia's state courts in deciding which services are "incidental," but it is persuasive evidence
requiring rebuttal by C & P. See Defendants' Memorandum at 31.
54. Defendants' Memorandum at 31 (citing General TeL, 449 F.2d at 855). See also General
Tel. Co. of Cal. v. F.C.C., 413 F.2d 390,401-02 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888
(1969).
55. Defendants' Memorandum at 28, 32.
56. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). See also Defendants' Memorandum at 27.
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zoning regulations which allegedly caused prohibitively high housing
costs."' The Supreme Court held that, absent the zoning laws, the
"economics of the area housing market" would continue to result in
expensive housing costs. Consequently, the plaintiffs would still be unable
to afford housing unless low-income residential structures were built58
As the plaintiffs had not shown that any third parties were interested in
building such housing, there was not a substantial probability that their
injury would be redressed by striking down the zoning ordinances
involved.59
In Chesapeake and Potomac, the Government claimed that, even if
Section 533(b) were eliminated as an obstacle, C & P still had not proven
that there was a substantial probability that it would receive a franchise
from Alexandria.' C & P had not shown that the city had any intention
of granting it a franchise; it merely had shown that Alexandria would
consider its application for one.62 To prove its injury was redressable,
C & P should have submitted its application for a franchise to Alexan-
dria,63 which the Government claimed would not violate Section
533(b).' Thus, only after C & P received the franchise would the
redressability aspect of standing be satisfied.
The district court rejected the Government's arguments regarding
C & P's lack of standing. Referring to Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.,65 the district court held that the challenged
statute did not have to be the sole obstacle but must be an absolute barrier
for C & P to satisfy the causation issue.66 Even if C & P obtained the
57. Id at 502-05.
58. Id. at 506.
59. Id at 504-08.
60. Defendants' Memorandum at 32-33.
61. Id at 32.
62. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 911.
63. Defendants' Memorandum at 32.
64. d at 34 n.33. The Government stated that in January 1992, a local telephone company
had been granted a franchise, and the telephone company subsequently sought a waiver for
§ 533(b)(1) pursuant to § 533(b)(4). Id
65. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
66. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 916 (In footnote 11, the district court supports
its findings:
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252, 261 . . . (standing exists where challenged
statute was 'absolute barrier' to plaintiff's goal, despite the fact that invalidation
of statute would not 'guarantee' achievement of that goal); see also Nyquist v.
Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 6 n.7... (1977), (unnecessary for plaintiff to apply for and
be denied a loan in order to establish his standing to challenge the statute making
him ineligible for the loan, 'in light of the certainty of [the loan's] denial' under
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requisite approval of the Virginia Corporation Commission, Section 533(b)
would absolutely bar it from receiving a franchise. In addition, the district
court referred to Regents of University of Cal. v. Bakke6' to support
C & P's satisfaction of the redressability aspect since "standing exists for
[a] plaintiff unconstitutionally deprived of [the] opportunity to compete for
a benefit, without proof that, in the absence of the challenged program,
[the] plaintiff necessarily would have received the benefit." ' Therefore,
the district court held that C & P had standing.
The district court further held that to require the plaintiffs to pursue
a franchise "in the face of a federal statute that expressly forbids them from
engaging in the activity in question" would be "formalistic and wasteful of
governmental and societal resources."69  Citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,7" the district court stated that causation and redressability are
essentially rhetorical issues once it has been established that the plaintiff is
affected by the action:
When the suit is one challenging the legality of government
action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be
averred (at the summary judgment stage) or proved (at the
trial stage) in order to establish standing depends considerably
upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action
(or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little
question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and
that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress
it.
71
B. First Amendment Rights of the
Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company
The second and most important legal issue of Chesapeake and
Potomac involved C & P's First Amendment rights. C & P contended that
its First Amendment rights to free speech were directly inhibited by this
statute since it could not express itself through video programming;
the statutory scheme).
Id.
67. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
68. Chesapeake and Potomac, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11822 at 21-22 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 281 n.14) (emphasis added).
69. Id at "23.
70. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
71. Chesapeake and Potomac, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11822 at "23 n.12 (quoting Lujan, 112
S. Ct. at 2137).
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therefore, Section 533(b) was subject to a strict scrutiny level of review 2
or at least an intermediate level of review.'3 However, both the Govern-
ment and the intervenor-defendant, National Cable Television Association,
Inc. ("NCTA"), argued that this statute was an economic regulation with
only an incidental effect upon C & P's First Amendment rights to free
speech, thereby subjecting the statute to only a rational basis level of
scrutiny.7
4
The Government and NCTA also argued that the government could
regulate certain businesses if the purpose of such regulation was to promote
competition, resulting in a greater dissemination of information (one of the
purposes behind the First Amendment free speech clause)." In such a
case, those businesses could not use the First Amendment to prohibit the
government from regulating them. 6 To support this argument, both the
Government and NCTA relied heavily on Associated Press v. United
States."
In Associated Press, the government, under the authority of federal
antitrust laws, regulated the plaintiff's distribution and membership
practices because those practices gave members a "competitive advantage
over their rivals."'8 The Court deferred to the government's interests and
its means for attaining those goals since "[f]reedom of the press from
governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction
repression of that freedom by private interests."' 9
In determining that heightened scrutiny was required in Chesapeake
and Potomac, the district court did not address this specific argument.
Instead, it emphasized that "'[c]able television... is engaged in "speech"
72. To pass strict scrutiny, the regulation must support a compelling public interest and must
be the least restrictive means to effect that interest. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989).
73. Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 25, 47-48. To pass an intermediate level of review, the
regulation must satisfy the O'Brien test as explained in part I.B.2.
74. Defendants' Memorandum at 36-45; Memorandum of Intervenor-Defendant National
Cable Association, Inc. in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support
of its Cross-Motion for Summary Motion at 41-45, Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. 909
(E.D. Va. 1993) [hereinafter Intervenor's Memorandum]. To satisfy the rational basis test, the
regulation must serve a permissible public interest and must be a reasonable means to further that
interest. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 796 (1978).
75. Defendants' Memorandum at 36-45; Intervenor's Memorandum at 41-45.
76. Defendants' Memorandum at 38-45; Intervenor's Memorandum at 41-45.
77. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
78. Id at 4-17.
79. Id at 20 (footnote omitted).
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form of the telephone companies' speech or (2) an economic
regulation directed at non-speech conduct, but inflicting a
substantial, and disproportionate, incidental effect on the
telephone companies' right to engage in expressive activity.'
However, the telephone companies were only restricted from transmitting
video programming rather than prohibited from transmitting any visual
image. Since this restriction required an examination of what was being
transmitted, it was a content-based regulation and the traditional categories
did not apply. 6 Prior to 1986, the district court probably would have
determined that Section 533(b) was content-based and thus subject to a
strict level of scrutiny. In 1986, though, the U.S. Supreme Court in City
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.8Y determined that a regulation having
"secondary effects" or legislative goals, justified by reasons "unrelated to
the suppression of free expression, '' s8 was content-neutral and thereby only
subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, not strict scrutiny. 89
Although the district court in Chesapeake and Potomac expressed
reservations about allowing "a legislative act curtailing First Amendment
rights ... to be evaluated based on its justification rather than on its
operation," ' it could find no U.S. Supreme Court case limiting the rule
from Renton.91 Instead, it determined that the U.S. Supreme Court in
Discovery Networ 92 had refused to do so. 3 Therefore, the district court
felt compelled to follow the Renton rule. 4
In examining the legislative reasons for enacting Section 533(b), the
district court determined that the two advanced by the Government-"(1)
protecting diversity of ownership of communications outlets and (2)
promoting competition in the video programming market"-were not
related to the speech being denied C & P.95 The district court decided,
then, that Section 533(b) fell under the Renton rule and was subject to an
intermediate level of scrutiny as a regulation that was "'justified' on
85. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 922 (footnotes omitted).
86. Id. at 922-23.
87. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
88. Id at 48.
89. Id at 47-49, 51-52.
90. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 925.
91. Id
92. 113 S. Ct. at 1517.
93. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 924-26.
94. Id
95. Id. at 924, 926.
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under the First Amendment. '" "° As a result, C & P's First Amendment
freedom to communicate through this medium was abridged by Section
533(b). Therefore, the district court held that a rational basis level of
scrutiny was not sufficient since even economic regulations were subject to
a higher level of scrutiny if they "disproportionately impact[ed] entities
engaged in speech protected by the First Amendment."'"
To determine whether Section 533(b) should be subject to an
intermediate or a strict level of scrutiny, the court examined whether the
section was content-neutral or content-based.
1. Section 533(b)--"Content-Neutral" or "Content-Based"
A law is content-neutral when the determination as to what speech
is being regulated does not require an examination of the contents of that
speech whereas a content-based regulation is one that requires an examina-
tion of the contents of the speech to determine whether that speech may be
regulated under the law.82 For example, in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network; Inc., 3 the U.S. Supreme Court determined that a local law
banning newsracks with commercial publications from public property was
content-based since the contents of the newsrack (whether it contained
commercial publications or not) had to be examined in order to determine
whether the newsrack was banned." If the ordinance had banned all
newsracks, then the regulation of those newsracks would not have been
dependent upon what type of speech they contained (here commercial
speech), and the regulation would have been considered content-neutral.
In Chesapeake and Potomac, the district court determined that:
[A] statute restricting telephone companies from providing
video programming to customers within their service areas
would fall within one of the two content-neutral categories
either as: (1) a time, place, and manner restriction on the
80. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 918 (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct.
1438, 1442 (1991)). See also City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc, 476 U.S.
488 (1986).
81. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 918. To support its decision, the court cited
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 704 (1986).
82. See generally Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41
(1986); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
83. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
84. Id. at 1517.
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grounds unrelated to the suppression of the speech."" Therefore, the
district court used the intermediate level of scrutiny test of United States v.
O'Brien."
2. The O'Brien Test
In O'Brien, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a law was constitu-
tional:
[I]f it is within the constitutional power of Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest s
In subsequent cases, the Court has upheld the O'Brien test."
In Chesapeake and Potomac, the district court applied the O'Brien
test: the law is constitutional if its "provisions 'are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, ... they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and... they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the informa-
tion." '' 'I ° The court found that, since Section 533(b) fell under the
Renton rule,' the first prong of the O'Brien test was automatically
satisfied.
In its arguments, C & P addressed the two governmental interests
that the district court had accepted. The district court found that the federal
government had two interests when it passed the Act which were unrelated
to the suppressed speech: "protecting diversity of ownership of communi-
cations outlets" and "promoting competition in the video programming
market."' 2  C & P argued that these interests were not constitutionally
96. Id at 926 (citation omitted).
97. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
98. Id at 377.
99. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd
sub nom. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
100. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 917 (quoting Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2753)
(citation omitted).
101. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
102. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 924. The Government supported its
advancement of these two interests through references to H.R. REP. No. 934,98th Cong., 2d Sess.
19 at 55 (1984) and S. REP. No. 456, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 at 9 (1990). Intervenor's
Memorandum at 46 n.82.
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protected since the House of Representatives relied on a U.S. Supreme
Court case"03 that allowed Congress to regulate broadcast television
cross-ownership due to the scarcity of airwaves." 4 C & P implied that
cable television was significantly different from broadcast television
because its transmissions were sent through cables which could be laid
anywhere in seemingly limitless numbers. Since scarcity was not an issue
for cable television, Congress was not empowered to regulate this
industry."05 Although the district court did discuss the scarcity rationale
when addressing the level of scrutiny to be utilized,' 6 it did not discuss
whether the federal government's interests were constitutionally protected.
The district court assumed that these government interests were protect-
ed.1
07
The district court then separated the second prong, "narrowly tailored
to serve a significant government interest,"'0 8 into two parts: "a signifi-
cant government interest" and "narrowly tailored" to serve that government
interest.'°9
The district court held that the second governmental interest of
promoting competition was not legitimate since cable companies were
already miniature monopolies and Section 533(b) actually inhibited
competition by prohibiting a potential competitor-the telephone compa-
nies-from entering into the market. ° However, the district court found
that the first governmental interest of diversity of ownership was "signifi-
cane' based on FCC v. National Citizens Commission for Broadcasting."'
To determine if the regulation was "narrowly tailored" to implement
this governmental interest, the district court had to decide if the "restriction
on alleged First Amendment freedoms [was] no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest"" 2 but did not "burden substantially more
speech than [was] necessary.""'
103. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
104. H.R. Rep. No. 934 at 32-33.
105. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 51-53.
106. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 918-19.
107. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
108. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 926.
109. ld. at 927-28.
110. 1& at 927.
111. 1d& at 927-28. See also FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S.
775, 801-802 (1978) (the regulation of broadcast media was held to be in the public's interest).
112. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (emphasis added). See also City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810 (1984).
113. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
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C & P argued that Section 533(b) restricted its First Amendment
speech more than necessary by not satisfying the aim of diversity since
diversity was not actually promoted." 4 C & P contended that since cable
television companies were already monopolies and Section 533(b)
prevented the telephone companies from entering the market in competition
with them, the actual effect of the restriction was "precisely the opposite of
'diversity."' 115 Thus, C & P argued that Section 533(b) did not further
the governmental interest at all; therefore, the regulation was not narrowly
tailored to serve the governmental interest. In support of its contention,
C & P cited reports from the FCC, 6 the Department of Justice,"7 and
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration ("NTIA")
of the Department of Commerce,"' all of which concluded that removing
Section 533(b)'s prohibition would further the goal of diversification."
19
The district court, in Chesapeake and Potomac, focused on the
multiplicity of alternatives available to Congress instead of addressing
C & P's argument regarding diversity.' It acknowledged that a law was
constitutional even after a court decides that the government's interest could
be adequately served by some less-restrictive alternative.' In contrast,
"the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the . . .
regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation."" ' Despite its acknowl-
edgment of these U.S. Supreme Court holdings, the court concluded Section
533(b) failed the second prong since:
[E]ffective alternatives exist that would allow telephone
companies to enter the cable television market, yet prevent the
evils allegedly targeted by @ [sic] 533(b), the Court finds that
@ [sic] 533(b) is not "narrowly tailored to serve a significant
114. Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 55-57.
115. I at 55.
116. Video Dialtone Order, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 5781, 5850 (1992) ("we conclude that the ability
of local telephone companies to have significant ownership interests in [cable television] ... will
further increase cbmpetition in the video market.").
117. Reply Comments of the United States Department of Justice, Telephone Company-Cable
Television Cross-Ownership Rules, CC Dkt 87-266 at 44 (Mar. 13, 1992) (the Department of
Justice recommended that § 533(b) should be changed "to allow another competitor to enter the
video programming market." Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 55-56).
118. NTIA, Telecommunications in the Age of Information, REPORT at 234 (1991).
119. Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 55-56.
120. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 928-32.
121. Id. at 928.
122. Ward v. Rock Against Racism. 491 U.S. 781. 799 (quoting United States v. Albertini,
472 U.S. 675. 689 (1985)).
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governmental interest," but instead, that the statute "burdens
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the
government's legitimate interests."'"
In its analysis, the district court discussed three alternatives. First, Section
533(b) did not prohibit video transmission (only video programming) by the
telephone companies in their service areas. 4 Second, telephone compa-
nies, therefore, could cross-subsidize such video transmissions."n Last,
regulatory oversight by the FCC could prevent anticompetitive activity even
in the absence of Section 533(b).' 6 Of these three, only the third really
showed how the "government interest . . . would be achieved less
effectively absent the restriction."'127
The district court easily determined that the third prong of the
O'Brien tests was also satisfied. 9 It stated:
[P]laintiffs remain unfettered in their ability to communicate
by any means other than video programming. Moreover,
plaintiffs may directly provide video programming to anyone
residing outside their area of service. Finally, plaintiffs may
communicate with subscribers inside their service area through
video programming by producing such programming and
marketing it to broadcasters and cable operators. Plaintiffs are
by no means "silenced" by the operation of @ [sic]-
533(b). 130
According to the district court, Section 533(b) was unconstitutional
since it was not "narrowly tailored" to the legitimate legislative interest.
123. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 932 (citations omitted in original).
124. In other words, the telephone companies could send video images through their wires
in their service areas, but they could not be the originators of such images (for example, a cable
company could pay a telephone company to send its programming over the telephone company's
wires, but the telephone company could not buy or create programming and transmit it over its
own wires in its service areas). Id at 926.
125. Although a telephone company could not transmit its own programming over its wires
in its service areas, it could fund programming in the service areas of other telephone companies.
In addition, telephone companies could create programming and sell it to cable television
companies. Id
126. Id at 929-31.
127. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
128. The third prong states that the restrictions ."'leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information ..... Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 917 (citing
Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2753, quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293 (1984)).
129. Id. at 926.
130. Id.
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1II. ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRICT COURT HOLDING
Taking into account the several thousands of pages the district court
considered before rendering an opinion,31 its decision is a fairly straight-
forward analysis. Despite its relative simplicity, however, the district
court's rationale for its holding may be overturned by the appellate court
based on one of the following: (1) Section 533(b) is economic legislation
with only an incidental effect on C & P's First Amendment rights and thus
subject to a rational basis test instead of the O'Brien intermediate scrutiny
test; (2) Congress has the right to legislate activity that would suppress
speech; (3) the second prong of the O'Brien test, as elucidated in Ward,
was applied incorrectly, thereby making Section 533(b) constitutional; (4)
Section 533(b) would fail Ward's requirement that the legislation "pro-
moteo a substantial government interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation";'32 or (5) the governmental interest-to
encourage diversity-was either unconstitutional or not effectively
promoted through Section 533(b).
3
A. Section 533(b) is Economic Legislation
Subject to a Rational Basis Test
The U.S. Supreme Court usually defers to Congress in its review of
the government's interests, and the means used to attain those interests, for
economic legislation which only incidentally affects free speech.134
Although this argument is valid under a rational basis standard of review,
the U.S. Supreme Court usually requires some support for the legitimacy
of the governmental interests and the efficacy of the means under a higher
standard of review. Therefore, the issue is whether the appellate court will
view Section 533(b) as economic legislation subject only to a rational basis
standard of review or whether it will impose a higher standard of review.
An examination of U.S. Supreme Court cases would not offer the
appellate court a solution to its dilemma. For example, in Minneapolis
Star, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the "Federal Government can
subject newspapers to generally applicable regulations without creating
131. Id. at 912.
132. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (citation omitted).
133. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 932.
134. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text. See also Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581-85 (1983).
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constitutional problems.' 135  In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,36 howev-
er, the Court stated, in deciding Minneapolis Star, "[wie imposed a greater
burden of justification [than that of rational basis] on the State even though
the [restriction] was imposed upon a nonexpressive activity, since the
burden... fell disproportionately... upon the shoulders of newspapers
exercising the constitutionally protected freedom of the press." 137
When reviewing the FCC's rule on newspaper-television station
cross-ownership in FCC v. National Citizens Commission for Broadcast-
ing138 ("NCCB"), though, the Court did not use any heightened level of
scrutiny in unanimously rejecting the plaintiff's First Amendment
claim.'
39
Since there are not any U.S. Supreme Court cases concerning
telephone-cable television cross-ownership regulations, 1"t the appellate
court will have to determine if this type of First Amendment restriction on
telephone companies is similar to Minneapolis Star or NCCB. In Minneap-
olis Star, the economic legislation imposed a disproportionate burden
whereas in NCCB the economic regulation did not result in heightened
scrutiny. Although the district court held that Section 533(b) was economic
legislation imposing a disproportionate burden on C & P's First Amend-
ment rights, 4' the appellate court may arrive at a different conclusion
since this is a case of first impression.
B. Congress' Right to Legislate Activity that Suppresses Speech
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently ruled against First
Amendment claims when the regulation being challenged seeks to regulate
activity that would inhibit freedom of speech. 42 In Associated Press, the
135. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 581 (emphasis added). See also Citizen Publishing Co.
v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143,
155-56 (1951); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1946);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 6-7. 19-20 (1945).
136. 478 U.S. 697 (1985).
137. Id at 704.
138. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
139. Id. at 801-02.
140. In General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971), the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that a telephone-cable cross-ownership restriction was
"reasonable" and "bears a rational relationship" to the governmental interest of diversity. Id. at
859-60. In General TeL, however, the plaintiff did not raise the Fast Amendment issue.
141. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 921-22.
142. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); NCCB, 436 U.S. 775; National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1941).
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Court held that "[flreedom of the press from governmental interference
under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by
private interests."' 43 Under such circumstances, the Court will defer to
the government's interests and its means for attaining those interests.
In NCCB, the Court expanded this holding to other forms of mass
media. It found the restriction on newspaper-television station cross-
ownership a "reasonable means"1" of promoting diversification in mass
communications and refused to utilize a heightened level of scrutiny. 5
When reviewing Chesapeake and Potomac, the appellate court may
find that a restriction on telephone-cable cross-ownership restriction is just
as "reasonable [a] means" of promoting diversification as a restriction on
newspaper-television station cross-ownership. Also, since the government's
goal of diversification "is not only consistent with, but is actually
supportive of the values underlying the First Amendment,"' 46 it is not
likely that the appellate court will impose a heightened level of scrutiny.
C. The Second Prong of the O'Brien Test Was Incorrectly Applied
As stated previously, 47 the district court found Section 533(b)
unconstitutional since it failed the second prong of the O'Brien test-the
restriction must be "'narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest. ' ' Despite its detailed analysis, the district court did not
correctly apply the second prong in this case. It found one alternative that
would actually satisfy the governmental interest of ownership diversity
without requiring a restriction of C & P's First Amendment rights.
According to Ward, however, finding a less restrictive alternative does not
make the restriction unconstitutional. 49
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court in Ward seemed to defer to the
legislature when it stated that "the requirement of narrow tailoring is
satisfied 'so long as the.., regulation promotes a substantial governmental
interest..... ° If the appellate court follows the Supreme Court's lead, it
too will defer to the government's interest in promoting diversity, thereby
143. 326 U.S. at 20 (footnote omitted).
144. 436 U.S. at 802.
145. It at 780-802.
146. Id. at 800 n.18 (citing Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20).
147. See supra notes 102-27 and accompanying text.
148. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
149. Ward, 491 U.S. at 800.
150. Id. at 799 (citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
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finding that Section 533(b) is constitutional and overturning the district
court's decision.
D. The Governmental Interest Could Be Achieved
as Effectively Absent the Regulation
As previously discussed,' the trial court's application of the
second prong of the O'Brien test was inaccurate since the U.S. Supreme
Court held in Ward that a law is narrowly tailored if it promotes a
substantial government interest. If the appellate court finishes its
analysis at this point, it will uphold the constitutionality of Section 533(b),
thus overturning the district court's decision.
By adding the phrase "that would be achieved less effectively absent
the regulation,"' 5' though, the Supreme Court has established one loophole
for invalidating the restriction. Although the district court did not utilize
this loophole, it did find that regulatory oversight by the FCC could prevent
anti-competitive activity even in the absence of Section 533(b)." This
regulatory oversight would promote diversity as well or even better than
Section 533(b) does. As a result, the appellate court might find that this
alternative of regulatory oversight fits this loophole and affirm the lower
court's decision for this reason rather than for the reasons stated by the
district court.
E. The Governmental Interest Is Unconstitutional or
Ineffectively Promoted Through Section 533(b)
The appellate court may also uphold the district court's finding
despite its inappropriate application of the second prong. It might decide
that one of C & P's two additional arguments about the governmental
interest is valid: (1) that the governmental interest itself is invalid"s' or
(2) that the regulation does not "serve" the governmental interest of
diversity of ownership at all since the effect of Section 533(b) is to
eliminate diversity.
156
151. See supra part C.
152. See supra part C.
153. See supra part C.
154. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
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Despite C & P's persuasiveness, the appellate court will probably not
be convinced by the latter argument. If Section 533(b) is eliminated, the
worst case scenario will be that, instead of having cable companies
controlling the video market and telephone companies controlling the
telephonic market, the telephone companies will control both the telephonic
and video markets. Thus, some diversity, limited as it is, is promoted by
Section 533(b) and will be lost in the absence of the regulation.
However, it is possible that the appellate court might find C & P's
former argument more persuasive. The district court's decision that the
governmental interest was significant was based on a broadcast media case
which found the congressional regulation of such media is constitutional
based on the scarcity of available airwaves.'" Arguably, as the district
court recognized, video programming transmitted through cables is not
limited in the same manner as airwaves.' s8 The appellate court may then
be convinced by C & P's argument that Congress should not be able to
regulate the cable industry in the same manner that it may broadcast media
and may uphold the lower court's holding.
IV. CONCLUSION
Recently, Bell Atlantic, the parent company of the plaintiffs,
C & P, 59 acted upon the district court's decision by announcing its
merger with TCI, one of the nation's largest cable companies, on October
13, 1993.16 This $33 billion merger, touted as the "biggest in histo-
ry,'W61 is expected to "erase [the] boundaries between phone and cable
services."' 62 Although the details of the merger should be completed in
157. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 801-02 (1978).
158. Chesapeake and Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 918-19.
159. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
160. Kevin Maney, Tech Today, Tomorrow / Technology's Hope: Is It Simply Hype?, USA
TODAY, January 26, 1994, at lB. Bell Atlantic believes it will be able to obtain the relevant
antitrust waivers from the government to allow the completion of this merger. Julie Vorman, Bell
Atlantic <BELN> Sees TV Box Standard in 5 Yrs, REUrERS, LIMITED, January 26, 1994, at
Financial Report, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. In addition, Bell Atlantic is
confident that it will receive the requisite long-distance waiver, necessary due to the consent
decree from AT&T's divestiture which prohibits the Baby Bells from participating in the long-
distance market. Telephone Interview with Paul Miller, Corporate Relations, Bell Atlantic, in
Richmond, Va. (January 27, 1994).
161. Julie Vorman, Bell Atlantic Aims to Invest in 7V Programs, Reuter Business Report,
January 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
162. Vorman, supra note 160.
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approximately two weeks, the actual merger between the two corporations
will probably not be completed until the beginning of next year. 163
Despite the potential reversal of the Chesapeake and Potomac
holding, Bell Atlantic plans to establish a test program this spring that will
install "TV set-top software boxes" in approximately 2,000 homes'6 in
Alexandria." Seemingly anticipating success in Bell Atlantic's test
program, TO plans to manufacture about one million of the "set-top" boxes
later this year.1"
Southwestern Bell has joined Bell Atlantic in anticipating that
Section 533(b) will no longer be a barrier to the development of a multi-
communications system. 6' Aside from these telephone companies, other
companies-notably Time Warner, US West, Pacific Telesis, Microsoft,
Blockbuster, and Viacom-have also joined the scramble to enter the multi-
communications market. 6
If the district court's holding in Chesapeake and Potomac stands, a
multi-communications package may be available through local telephone
companies and cable television companies within the next two years. 69
Public opinion and interest seem to be in favor of the changes that are
occuring as a result of this case.170 However, the case could be reversed
upon appeal due to one of the flaws in the district court's holding.
163. Julie Vorman, Bell Atlantic <BELN> Sees MergerAccord in 2 Weeks, Reuters, Limited,
January 26, 1994, at Financial Report, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
164. Vorman, supra note 161. These boxes "will allow consumers to select movies and other
programs for entertainment and news, as well as ... for a host of services such as banking and
shopping." Vorman, supra note 160. An additional feature of these boxes is that consumers will
be able to use VCR-like functions like fast forward, rewind, and stop on the programs they select.
Vorman, supra not 161.
165. Maney, supra note 160.
166. Vorman, supra note 160. The exact date when TCl will commence manufacturing is
unknown since technical experts have yet to decide on the specifications for the type of "set-top"
box that the entire industry will use. Id.
167. Maney, supra note 160. Southwestern Bell anticipates a successful conclusion to its
attempts to buy Hauser Communications and a portion of Cox Cable. Id.
168. Id Time Warner is establishing a test program in Orlando, FL; US West and Pacific
Telesis are building fiber-optic networks; Microsoft is researching software; and Viacom and
Blockbuster plan to merge this year and may be joined by Paramount Communications. I&a
169. Carla Lazzareschi, Ruling May Spur Phone-Cable Competition, L.A. TIMES, August 25,
1993, at Al. Despite the optimism expressed last year, Bell Atlantic does not expect an industry
standard for their "set-top" boxes to emerge for at least five years. Vorman, supra note 160.
Microsoft does not anticipate any real progress towards a multi-communications system for five
to ten years. Maney, supra note 160.
170. See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
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Even if the district court decision is reversed upon appeal, a multi-
communications system will still be available through airwave transmissions
due to the FCC's decision to auction off or disperse by lottery airwaves for
PCS and lVDS systems.17 1 It might even be available through local
telephone and cable television companies if Congress repeals Section
533(b) as recommended by the FCC 72 -the initiation of such services
would simply be delayed until Congress acts.
JoAnn Lam
171. Lazzaxeschi, supra note 7; Eckhouse, supra note 8.
172. Video Dialtone Order, 7 FCC Rcd. at 5847.
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